On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion by Seldeslachts, Jo et al.
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.sfbtr15.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer · Department of Economics · University of Bonn · D-53113  Bonn, 
Phone: +49(228) 73 9220 · Fax: +49 (228) 73 9221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2008 
 
 
*Jo Seldeslachts, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany, E-Mail : 
seldeslachts@wzb.eu, Tel: +49 30 2549 1404  
**Tomaso Duso, Humboldt University and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, 
Germany, E-Mail : duso@wzb.eu, Tel: +49 30 2549 1403 
***Enrico Pennings, Dept. of Applied Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands, E-mail: pennings@few.eur.nl, Tel: +31 10 40 82166 
 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
Discussion Paper No. 240 
On the Stability of Research Joint 
Ventures: Implications for 
Collusion 
Jo Seldeslachts* 
Tomaso Duso** 
Enrico Pennings*** 
On The Stability of Research Joint Ventures: 
Implications for Collusion 
 
 
 
Jo Seldeslachts 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) 
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany  
E-Mail : seldeslachts@wzb.eu 
Tel: +49 30 2549 1404 
 
Tomaso Duso* 
Humboldt University and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB)  
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany  
E-Mail : duso@wzb.eu 
Tel: +49 30 2549 1403 
 
Enrico Pennings 
Dept. of Applied Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
E-mail: pennings@few.eur.nl 
Tel: +31 10 40 82166 
 
 
March 2008 
 
Abstract: Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture (RJV) participation 
facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general 
theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of 
research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we 
show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.  
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1. Introduction 
Although joint R&D activities among firms are encouraged everywhere today, the same old 
suspicion still lingers: does cooperation in R&D facilitate product market collusion? Given that so 
many firms participate in research joint ventures (RJVs), it is important to get a clearer view on 
this issue. On a more general level, empirical studies testing the theoretical predictions of collusion 
are relatively rare because of problems of selection bias and a lack of adequate data (Levinstein 
and Suslow, 2006). This paper constructs and applies an indirect test of collusion through RJVs. 
We build upon the conjecture that RJVs may facilitate product market collusion.1 A 
necessary condition for RJVs to be used as collusive devices seems their stability. Cabral (2000, 
p1041), for example, states that “Firms may delay innovation [and stay in the RJV] with the sole 
purpose of maintaining a sufficiently credible punishment for cheating on the price agreement”.2 
Indeed, RJVs make collusion in the product market easier, but only when participants are 
effectively able to use the RJV as a coordination or punishment device. When a firm is observed to 
leave the RJV, it is likely that the intended collusion was not sustainable or that the RJV was 
started for reasons unrelated to collusion. Similarly, the stability of collusive agreements is 
negatively affected by a firm’s entry (Vasconcelos, 2004). Therefore, when a firm enters an RJV 
after its initial formation, it is less likely that this RJV (still) serves collusion.  
 Suspicion of collusion is especially relevant for large-scale cooperations between firms 
operating in the same industry. In a general context, Stigler (1950) realized that firms outside the 
collusive agreement have incentives to freeride, which makes relatively smaller agreements 
                                                 
1 RJVs may induce collusion through creating common assets – and therefore common interests – among participating 
firms and provide therefore a credible punishment mechanism (Cabral, 2000; Martin, 1995). This idea is reminiscent 
of Bernheim and Whinston’s (1990) theory of multi-market contact: firms that interact in more than one market are 
able to sustain collusion more easily. RJVs may further induce collusion when being used as a vehicle for the 
transmission of information to signal cooperative behavior (Cooper and Ross, 2007).  
2 Martin (1995, p. 734) makes a similar argument: “The threat to break up an R&D joint venture can form part of a 
fallback strategy that will sustain tacit collusion on product markets.” Catilina and Feinberg (2006) model RJV 
participation and collusion decisions as a coalition formation game. They find that when both decisions are taken 
simultaneously, the stability of the RJV and product market collusion are one-to-one related.  
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unstable. Therefore, it is hypothesized that more RJV participants increase the stability of the RJV. 
Noticeably, large RJVs in high concentration industries are of concern. Both higher rewards of 
colluding and easier detection of defection make these industries more interesting for collusion 
(Ordover and Baumol, 1988; Levinstein and Suslow, 2006). This leads us to test if the stability of 
the RJV, and hence, as supposed, the incidence of collusion, is significantly affected by industry 
concentration when the RJV is relatively large.  
To be fair, large research collaborations may serve their purpose, i.e. induce more research 
and learning. These learning dynamics lead firms to exit (Reuer and Zollo, 2005) and new firms to 
enter in the expectation to learn in this RJV. Therefore, we set as a necessary condition for a large 
RJV to be research-active (as opposed to facilitating collusion) its non-stability. Non-profit 
entities, such as universities and governmental research bodies, do not compete with firms in the 
product market. It seems therefore clear that their presence has a positive impact on (expectations 
of) learning (Sinha and Cusumano, 1991), but a negligible impact on collusive effects. We thus 
propose a second test to see whether large RJVs with non-profit members are less prone to be 
stable, and thus more likely to be research-active. 
The collaborations we investigate are set up under the US National Cooperative Research 
Act (NCRA). By granting certain antitrust exemptions, the NCRA stimulates firms operating in the 
same industry to cooperate in R&D on a large scale. The aim of the NCRA is to provide a solution 
to perceived competitive threats to U.S. high-tech industries, and has been a great success (see e.g. 
Vonortas, 1997). But, given their large scale and that members are competitors, there may be 
particular suspicion of firms using the NCRA-RJVs as vehicles for product market collusion, 
which makes them of particular interest for our study. 
We build a simple econometric framework to determine which factors explain an RJV’s 
stability. Controlling for the heterogeneity due to size differences through size dummies, we 
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investigate in a probit regression whether large RJVs’ stability is affected in a different way by 
their product market’s HHI and the presence of non-profit members. We control for other 
characteristics – including industry and year of formation dummies – that we expect to influence 
the probability of stability.  
The results indicate that RJVs are more stable in highly concentrated industries, but only 
when the RJVs are relatively large; the suspicion of collusion may therefore be justified. We also 
find some support for a negative impact of non-profit entities on the stability of the larger RJV. 
Given our results, it is desirable to go into more detail about which of these NCRA-RJVs can be 
identified as vehicles for collusion. Goeree and Helland (2007) also provide some recent (indirect) 
empirical support for the hypothesis that RJVs facilitate collusion. Analyzing NCRA-RJVs in the 
telecom industries, their paper exploits the variation in RJV formation generated by a more 
stringent U.S. antitrust stance towards collusion. If product market collusion is not a motivation to 
form an RJV, they argue, the propensity to enter into an RJV should not be affected by this change. 
By finding a lower RJV-participation after the policy, the authors conclude, as our study does 
through a different test using information on all sectors, that the NCRA-RJVs are suspect of being 
used for collusion. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses data and modeling 
issues. Section 3 discusses the main findings. Finally, in section 4, we conclude. 
 
2. Data and Modeling Issues 
Our main data set consists of information on the 785 formed NCRA-RJVs over the period 1985-
1999. Among the RJVs formed under the NCRA, slightly more than two-thirds (548) did not 
experience the entry or exit of any firm in any year of existence after their initial formation. We 
therefore define the main variable of interest to be a dummy (STABLE) that takes on the value of 
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one if the RJV did not experience any in-and-out movement during its lifespan, and zero 
otherwise. By doing this, we implicitly consider the entire RJV’s life as a single observational 
point. This is not crucial for the issue we want to study. Indeed, time does not play an important 
role in the analysis, as we are interested in questioning why no changes occurred during the sample 
period.3  
We then matched the RJV data with the Compustat North America database containing 
information on about 22,000 public U.S. firms (1986-1999). Each NCRA-RJV is linked to an 
industry by using the assigned RJV’s SIC2 code and the year as matching keys. For each industry 
(defined at the SIC2 level) and for each year, we calculate a measure of concentration (HHI), as 
well as medians and standard deviations for several other indicators, such as number of employees 
and R&D intensity. Given that we collapse the RJV’s life into one observation, we average the 
according industry characteristics over the number of periods for which the RJV is observed. 
While table 1 gives a short description of the main variables, in table 2 we report preliminary 
statistics for some relevant characteristics in the two sub-samples of stable vs. unstable RJVs. The 
central point of this note is to connect an RJV’s behavior to its product market’s concentration. 
Stable RJVs are found in slightly less concentrated industries; the HHI equals 0.07 in the stable 
sub-sample vs. 0.08 in the non-stable sub-sample (see table 2). A second factor of interest is how 
an RJV’s stability is linked to the number of non-profit members. Stable RJVs are found to include 
fewer non-profit entities (NON_Profit equals 0.33 vs. 0.75). We further control for relevant 
industry variables, as well as for the number of links an RJV has with other RJVs (for a detailed 
discussion of these variables, see Duso et al., 2007). 
The most eye-catching difference between stable and non-stable RVs, however, is the fact 
that stable RJVs are almost three times smaller than unstable ones in terms of participating for-
                                                 
3 Time might play a role in the sense that different RJVs are observed for a different number of time periods in the 
sample. We therefore control in the regressions for this issue by means of year-of-formation dummies. 
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profit firms in the year of RJV-formation (SIZE: 6.4 vs. 16.4 respectively).4 This is of course a 
statistical artifact since initially larger RJVs have, all else being equal, a higher probability of 
experiencing the exit of one of its members; we therefore have a closer look at the frequency of 
stable RJVs in relation to their size in table 3. Although the frequency of stable RJVs decreases 
almost steadily with the number of for-profit members, a sizeable proportion of medium-sized and 
large RJVs is stable. Hence, to assess the drivers of stability, we need to control for the 
heterogeneity due to size differences. For this purpose, in our statistical analysis we partition the 
RJVs into three size classes: small (up to three initial for-profit members), medium (4 to 9 initial 
for-profit members), and large (more than 10 initial for-profit members).5  
 We now propose a simple econometric framework to determine which factors explain an 
RJV’s stability. We first control for the heterogeneity due to size differences through dummies for 
size classes (sj). Second, we account for the fact that an RJV’s size might affect in a different way 
how product market’s and RJV’s characteristics influence its stability. Indeed, we argue that 
research cooperations might be used as a coordination device to collude in the product market, and 
that this problem may be more relevant when the RJV is large and embedded in a more 
concentrated industry. Second, we contend that learning might create dynamics in RJVs, where 
this is more likely to happen in large RJVs with more non-profit organizations participating. 
Hence, we model a size-dependent impact of product market concentration (HHI) as well as the 
number of non-profit members (NON_PROFIT) on an RJV’s stability. Finally, we control for 
other characteristics (X) – including industry and year of formation dummies – that we expect to 
                                                 
4 We focus on initial size to explain whether an RJV is stable along its lifetime in order to avoid endogeneity problems. 
Furthermore, initial size seems a more natural choice than, for example, the average number of firms participating in 
the RJV over its existence since it allows us to predict an RJV’s behavior just by looking at its initial composition. For 
a full analysis of RJV dynamics, see Duso et al. (2007). 
5 While it is clear that RJVs with up to 3 members are qualitatively different from the others in terms of dynamics, the 
definition of medium-sized RJVs is subjective. We chose to define as large RJV the top 20% of the size distribution. 
However, we tried with other classifications --including more size classes-- and the qualitative results were not 
affected. 
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influence the probability of stability. The probit regression to explain why RJV i in size class j is 
stable, is therefore the following  
,X NON_PROFITs  iijj
j
j ii
j
iijij
SMALLjj
ji HHIssSTABLE εδγβα ++++= ∑∑∑
≠
          (1) 
where εi is a i.i.d. error term.  
 
3. Results 
Table 4 reports the results of the Probit estimation of equation (1). As expected, the probability of 
being stable decreases with the size groups: Medium and large RJVs have respectively 48% and 
79% lower probability of being stable than small RJVs.  
Large RJVs may be used as a vehicle for collusion in the product market, and stability of 
these large collaborations is a necessary condition for this to be true. Consistent with this idea, we 
estimate a strongly positive and statistically significant effect of the industry’s concentration on the 
probability of being stable, and this only for large RJVs; a 10% increase in the HHI induces a 27% 
higher probability of a large RJV being stable. Interestingly, this effect is not significant for 
medium and small RJVs, which provides further evidence for our claim that especially large RJVs 
may be potentially used as a vehicle for collusion. Second, the presence of non-profit entities 
significantly decreases the probability of being stable, yet again only for large RJVs; a 10% 
increase in the log of the number of non-profit insiders decreases the probability of being stable by 
almost one percent. This suggests that large RJVs with non-profit organizations are effectively 
used for the main purpose of the NCRA. Firms cooperate in R&D and learn, which leads firms to 
exit and new firms to enter in the expectation to also learn.  
Other industry characteristics also matter for stability, yet their effects do not depend on the 
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size.6 First, industry size asymmetries appear to increase stability. Second, the probability of being 
stable significantly decreases by 63% in the high-tech software industries, suggesting a more 
active learning in these potentially high-spillover industries. Finally, our model is performing well 
in predicting RJVs’ behavior; it correctly classifies more than 83% of the observations and, most 
interestingly for this study, over 90% of the stable RJVs. 
 
4. Conclusions  
By using data from the U.S. National Cooperation Research Act, it is shown that large RJVs in 
concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collude. Large RJVs in which 
many non-profit organizations participate, on the other hand, have a lower propensity to be stable 
and are expected to mainly exist for research purposes. On a more methodological level, ours may 
be seen as an alternative test for collusive behavior through RVJ participation, which does not 
suffer from the typical problems of direct tests. 
 
References  
Bernheim, B.D. and M.D. Whinston, 1990, Multi-market Contact and Collusive Behaviour, 
Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 21, 1–26. 
Cabral, L., 2000, R&D Cooperation and Product Market Competition, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 18, 1033–1047.  
Catilina E. and R. M. Feinberg, 2006, Market Power and Incentives to Form Research 
Consortia, Review of Industrial Organization Vol. 28, 129–144.  
Cooper, R. and T. Ross, 2007, Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures, Journal of Law, 
                                                 
6 We tested whether the coefficients were size dependent. Given that it was not the case, we estimated an average 
effect, which allows a more efficient estimation. 
 8
Economics and Organization, Forthcoming.  
Duso, T., E. Pennings and J. Seldeslachts, 2007, The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: 
A Panel Data Analysis, Working Paper SP II 2007-11 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. 
Goeree, M. and E. Helland, 2007, Do Research Joint Ventures Facilitate Collusion?, Mimeo 
Claremont College.  
Levinstein, M.C. and V.Y. Suslow, 2006, What Determines Cartel Success, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 44, 43-95. 
 Martin, S., 1995, R&D Joint Ventures and Tacit Product Market Collusion. European 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. 11, 733–741. 
 Ordover, J. and A. Baumol, 1988, Antitrust Policy and High-Technology Industries, Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy Vol. 4, pp. 13-34. 
 Reuer, J. and M. Zollo, 2005, Termination Outcomes of Research Alliances, Research 
Policy Vol. 34 (1), 101-115. 
 Sinha, D. and M. Cusumano, 1991, Complementary Resources and Cooperative Research: 
A Model of Research Joint Ventures among Competitors, Management Science, Vol. 37 (9), 1091-
1106  
 Stigler, 1950, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, American Economic Review Papers 
and Proceedings, Vol. 40 (2), 23-34. 
Vasconcelos, H., 2004, Entry Effects on Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive 
Committee, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 24, 219-241. 
 Vonortas, N.S., 1997, Research Joint Ventures in the U.S., Research Policy Vol. 26, 577- 
595. 
 9
Table 1. Description of the Variables Used in the Regressions 
Variable Description 
STABLE Dummy equal to one if the RJV did not experience the entry or exit of any firm in any year after its 
formation 
SIZE Number of for profit participants in the RJV in its formation year. 
NON_PROFIT Number of non-profit participants in the RJV in its formation year. 
HHI Herfindahl index in a SIC2 industry based on sales, averaged over the RJV lifespan. 
FIRM_SIZE Median of employees at the SIC2 industry level (in thousand), averaged over the RJV lifespan. 
FIRM_SIZE_sd Standard deviation of employees at the SIC2 industry level (in thousand), averaged over the RJV 
lifespan. 
R&D INTENSITY Median R&D intensity (R&D expenditures/sales), averaged over the RJV lifespan. 
HightechM Dummy=1 if the industry is high-tech manufacturing industry according to the AeA7 (SIC4: 3571, 
3572, 3577, 3651, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3678, 3679, 3821, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3829, 3827, 3861, 
3812, 3844, 3845)  
HightechC Dummy=1 if the industry was high-tech communications industry according to the AeA (SIC4 codes: 
4812, 4813, 4822, 4841, 4899) 
HightechS Dummy=1 if the industry was high-tech software industry according to the AeA (SIC4 codes: 7371, 
7372, 7373, 7375, 7376, 7379)  
LINKS Number of links (i.e. average number of other RJVs where insiders in RJV i are present in time t), 
averaged over the RJV lifespan. 
 
Table 2. Preliminary Statistics – Variables used in the Regressions 
 
  Stable   Unstable 
 Mean St.Dev. Min Max   Mean St.Dev. Min  Max 
SIZE 6.42 13.37 1 159  16.4 23.75 1 180 
NON_PROFIT 0.33 1.47 0 18  0.75 4.51 0 52 
LINKS 27.21 25.28 1 123  30.30 29.53 1 122 
HHI 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.79  0.08 0.07 0.01 0.72 
FIRM_SIZE 0.83 0.82 0.01 5.93  0.96 1.15 0.02 5.35 
FIRM_SIZE_sd 2.80 0.89 0.46 4.54  2.52 0.97 -1.67 4.50 
R&D intensity 0.07 0.07 0 0.31  0.07 0.08 0 0.31 
hightechM 0.16 0.37 0 1  0.07 0.25 0 1 
hightechC 0.17 0.37 0 1  0.07 0.26 0 1 
hightechS 0.05 0.22 0 1   0.14 0.35 0 1 
Obs 548  237 
 
                                                 
7 The high-tech industries have been identified according to the American Electronics Association (AeA) classification 
(http://www.aeanet.org/Publications/IDMK_definition.asp). 
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Table 3. RJVs’ Size Distribution and Stability 
Number of  initial for-
profit insiders (SIZE) Stable Unstable  Size Classes 
24 1 
1 96.00  % 4.00 % 
207 6 
2 97.18 % 2.82 % 
89 15 
3 85.58 % 14.42 % 
Small RJVs 
(342) 
46 24 
4 65.71 % 34.29 % 
35 42 
5 45.45 % 54.55 % 
33 13 
6 71.74 % 28.26 % 
14 17 
7 45.16 % 54.84 % 
20 14 
8 58.82 % 41.18 % 
13 11 
9 54.17 % 45.83 % 
Medium RJVs 
(282) 
67 94 
10 or more 41.61 % 58.39 % 
Large RJVS 
(161) 
548 237 
Total 69.81 % 30.19 % 
785 
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Table 4. Probit Regression: The probability of Stability 
 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Std.Error  
SIZE MEDIUM -1.479 -0.477 0.282 *** 
SIZE LARGE -2.545 -0.790 0.341 *** 
HHI * SMALL -1.685 -0.482 1.866  
HHI * MEDIUM 2.463 0.704 1.892  
HHI * LARGE 9.611 2.749 3.499 *** 
NON_PROFIT*SMALL 0.050 0.014 0.300  
NON_PROFIT*MEDIUM -0.011 -0.003 0.216  
NON_PROFIT *LARGE -0.296 -0.085 0.153 * 
ENTRY_SIC2 4.168 1.192 4.399  
EXIT_SIC2 -19.789 -5.660 13.188  
FIRM_SIZE -0.215 -0.061 0.266  
FIRM_SIZE_sd 0.472 0.135 0.240 ** 
R&D-INTENSITY -0.212 -0.061 3.483  
hightechM -0.115 -0.034 0.249  
hightechC 0.024 0.007 0.356  
hightechS -1.699 -0.602 0.521 *** 
LINKS -0.030 -0.009 0.061  
# Obs 783 
Wald-Chi2 336.45 
Prob 0.0000 
pseudo-loglikelihood -269.20 
pseudo-R2 0.44 
Sensitivity 90.68% 
Specificity 66.95% 
Correctly classified 83.52% 
All size variables are transformed into logs. We control for industry dummies and 
for the RJV’s year of formation. The reported standard errors are computed using 
the robust/sandwich estimator. Significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% is represented by 
***, **, and * respectively 
